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During my two years as Sid Greenbaum’s colleague at the University of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee (1981-1983), one of my prominent memories involves a
Ph.D. exam that he constructed for an English language student in the department.
The exam consisted of one question. I forget the exact wording of the question, but
it went something like this: What is wrong with The Grammar of Contemporary
English; what are its weaknesses and inadequacies?’ The question is typical of Sid’s
teaching and scholarship. It does not ask the student what is contained within the
limits of our knowledge. It asks the student to explore what lies beyond.
Over the course of my career, Sid’s question has been of little concern to me. In
fact, I have been mainly concerned with just the opposite-finding ways to present
what GCE/CGE does accomplish, rather than what it does not. Each year, I teach
one course in modern English grammar, in which I use Sid’s A Concise Grammar
of Contemporary English, and two courses in the structure of modern English, in
which I use Sid’s A College Grammar of English (with a coursepack of supplemen-
tary notes taken from the more substantial grammars). I also teach various courses
in stylistics, and within stylistics, poetics; and in these courses, I use the grammati-
cal system developed in GCE/CGE to teach units on the syntax of prose fiction,
drama, and (most intensively) poetry. I also use GCE/CGE in my professional work
in stylistics. In the late 70s, I wrote a dissertation on poetic syntax using GCE as
my major reference work. During the 80s, I expanded this interest in poetic syntax
to prosody, writing a book on verse rhythm, and recently I have become interested
in poetics more generally. In this recent work, GCE/CGE has also been a constant
companion. In sum, over my career, I have found many useful applications for the
grammatical system developed in GCE/CGE; therefore, I have had little occasion
to reflect on the inadequacies of what it presents.
Lately, however, Sid’s question has been more and more on my mind. That is, I
have become more concerned with what GCE/CGE lacks rather than with what it
provides. Recently, the areas of my pedagogical and scholarly concern (stylistics,
poetics, prosody, etc.) have steadily languished, and this languishing is closely
connected to the limitations in GCE(CGE, in fact, to the limitations in all of our
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contemporary approaches to language. It is this connection between the needs of
an adequate stylistics/poetics and the limitations of our current grammars that I will
explore here.
Without taking dogmatic stands on controversial issues, GCE/CGE brilliantly
synthesizes our two major theoretical approaches to grammatical organization-the
formal and the functional. On one hand, syntax consists of a constrained system of
forms-a small inventory of word classes (noun, verb, etc.); phrasal and clausal
types (noun phrase, intransitive clause, etc.); and realizations of (tense, aspect,
voice, mood, number, gender, person, etc.), elaborations of (apposition, coordina-
tion, subordination, correlation, etc.), and interconnections and orderings among
these phrasal and clausal types (linearization, thematization, focus, pronominaliza-
tion, ellipsis, etc.).
As GCVCGE underlines, all grammars must describe these syntactic forms and
in doing so, acknowledge their functional autonomy: these forms have no transpar-
ent functional motivation, or at least none that we can articulate coherently and
convincingly given present knowledge. As any grammar teacher must stress repeat-
edly, the simple notional definitions of grammatical forms that we inherit from
classical times (and that provide the basis of most grammatical pedagogy in the
schools) cannot withstand scrutiny. Many nouns do not refer to persons, places, or
things. Many adverbs do not modify verbs, adjectives, or other adverbs. Many
subjects are not agents. And so forth.
From a functional point of view, the basic organizational features of syntax are
mysteries. Why are there just four major word classes: verb, noun, adjective, and
adverb? Why is syntax hierarchical and recursive? Why do grammars have phrases
as well as clauses, and why are the structures of phrases and clauses distinct? Why
are clauses broken into subsections (subject vs. predicate, operator vs. predication,
etc.)? Why do grammars need systems of gender and aspect, which mark large
subsets of possible nominal and verbal meanings? Why are words less volatile in
their structure than phrases, and phrases than clauses? What is a subject, anyway?
Our grammars cannot say.
The theoretical primitives of syntactic organization cannot be defined in func-
tional terms. These grammatical forms are just defined by their distribution and
collocation in the formal grammatical system of which they are a part. Within
linguistic theory, the motivation for grammatical form has been relegated to the
mysteries of genetics, neurology, and our species-specific endowment for language
(constraints on processing, etc.), matters which have not been connected in any
strong way with either the meanings that these forms convey or the social contexts
in which these forms are used.
On the other hand, it is also clear that we use grammatical forms in highly
constrained and organized ways, and GCVCGE carefully documents this (func-
tional) use. Most nouns do refer to persons, places, or things. Most verbs do refer
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to actions or states. And so forth. GCE/CGE presents extensive explorations of these
grammatical functions, often to high levels of delicacy. In fact, throughout
GCF./CGE, discussions of semantic function are at least as detailed as discussions
of grammatical form. For instance, CGE splits its treatment of verbs into two
balanced chapters, a seventy-nine page chapter on verbal forms (93-173) and a
sixty-eight page chapter on verbal meanings (173-240). In some of the other
chapters (e.g., on adverbials and subordinate clauses), discussions of form and
function are combined so intimately that they are impossible to untangle. At least
one chapter in CGE is composed primarily of semantic detail: CGE offers only
fifteen pages (657-72) that discuss prepositional form followed by thirty-six pages
(673-709) that consider prepositional meaning.
As GCVCGE documents, however, the functional complexity and diversity of
grammatical use frustrates any definitional relation between this use and grammati-
cal form. Being cognitively and historically available, grammatical forms can
indeed be used to get things done with words, but these uses do not seem to originate
from semantically/pragmatically coherent sources, and even so, once placed in
circulation, these uses proliferate in ways that are comparable to the proliferation
of lexical meanings. For instance, we do indeed use the past tense in English
primarily to refer to past time (e.g., I walked the dog yesterday), but we also use
the past tense to soften the directness of requests (e.g., Did you want to see me?)
and to mark a counterfactual (If I had a nickel, I’d buy a pickle.). These other uses
of the past tense have no (literal) relation to time.
The functional descriptions that GCVCGE claims are not based on any firm
theoretical basis either. We know even less about semantics than we do about syntax.
While grammars such as GCVCGE do indeed build up their formal descriptions
from certain basic terms and concepts, however unmotivated these basic terms and
concepts might be, they do not even attempt this for their functional descriptions;
these descriptions are entirely ad hoc. As Chomsky liked to reiterate in the early
days of generative grammar, certain areas of linguistics have achieved relatively
strong levels of observational adequacy (and even considerable levels of descriptive
adequacy), but explanatory adequacy has remained an unrealized dream.
For most practical purposes, this situation is not intolerably disturbing. All of
the grammatical phenomena discussed in GCE/CGE receive copious, satisfying
comment-on both form and function. The intense formal description makes the
grammar a useful resource in documenting usage and adjudicating prescriptive
disputes, and the intense functional description makes the grammar useful in many
applications-for example, to language awareness, second language learning,
dialectology, literary and cultural hermeneutics, and so forth. In fact, outside the
realm of pure theory, one might even wonder whether these limitations in the
explanatory bases of grammatical description have any serious consequences at all.
It would certainly be nice to know in some more principled way what motivates the
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grammatical order in language that we can observe and describe, but, in the end,
what would be the value of this knowledge? What aspects of our understanding and
appreciation of human nature or culture would be affected by such knowledge, even
if it were possible to achieve? Outside the academy, few are even aware that we
have no deep understanding of linguistic form and meaning. At lower levels in the
schools, and therefore in the society at large, this situation is just ignored. Students
are still asked to memorize the ancient &dquo;notional&dquo; definitions of parts of speech,
despite their inadequacy, and more complex grammatical issues are seldom considered.
The major consequence of this explanatory weakness in our linguistic theories,
I think, is its effect on our understanding of poetry and the relation between poetic
experience and our understanding of the human, both human nature and human
culture (including cultural history). As Roman Jakobson liked to remind us, our
great poets are our linguistic geniuses.2 To an extent that far exceeds our ability
consciously to analyze, our great poets achieve a deep intuitive feeling for the
intimate relation between the linguistic and the human and therefore a deep feeling
for the explanatory bases of language. In fact, as all critics who have thought deeply
about this issue have agreed, our great poetry is in some sense about these
explanatory bases. Our great poets do not just use language; they thematize the
linguistic and therefore give us our best evidence for what language-at the deepest
level-is. Jakobson and a few other mavericks aside, this close relation between
the linguistic and the poetic has been given much too little attention in contemporary
linguistic theory.
The major differences between poetry and other linguistic genres are (1) the
unity, concentration, and extent of its use of the materials of language, and (2) its
primarily nonreferential, rather than referential, intent. Not being art, most of our
uses of language are relatively loose, and even where this use is tight (e.g., in the
other language arts: song, prose fiction, and drama), our experience of the selection
and arrangement of linguistic forms themselves is not the major point. For example,
prose fiction also uses the many resources of language in intensive ways, but largely
as a means to another end: to build up fictional worlds of plots, characters, settings,
and so on. The central intent of prose fiction is to convey in some maximally
effective way what is perceived, felt, done, and thought in those fictional worlds,
not to focus on how those worlds are linguistically conveyed. Most prose fiction
can survive, with little loss, both paraphrase and transference to another medium
(for example, film).
With poetry, however, the opposite is the case. While prose builds worlds from
words, poetry builds worlds of words; therefore the fictional worlds that poems
convey, if they convey such worlds at all, are more an extension (or, as Amittai
Aviram [ 1994] likes to say, a &dquo;telling&dquo;) of their linguistic form. A novel uses
language to tell a story; a poem uses a story to &dquo;tell&dquo; language. Poems are &dquo;telling&dquo;
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language, and one of the major things that poems tell us, I think, is just that deep
explanation for linguistic organization that our current theories of language, dis-
course, and culture sorely lack.
The claim that poets &dquo;tell&dquo; us about language suggests that a principled poetics
might give us our best evidence for a principled linguistics, but in itself this claim
is still far removed from a solution to the relation between form and function in
language. This claim just shifts the burden of explanation to another (equally)
troubled field. Our critical theories have yielded revealing accounts of drama and
prose fiction, but our accounts of poetry remain sketchy and diffuse. Over the
centuries, various principles have been suggested to account for the structure and
effect of poetry and poetic language (parallelism, ambiguity, paradox, deviance,
foregrounding, iconicity, tension/emotivity, semantic overdetermination, trope,
etc.), but taken individually, each of these principles is inadequate, and, taken
together, these principles are little more than a chaotic list. At present, we have no
principled poetics, either.
A promising way to develop such a principled poetics, I would suggest, is to
take seriously the common claim that poetry is essentially a musical, and therefore
rhythmic, art-the claim that the basic concern of poetry is with time and human
inwardness rather than space and human outwardness. In this approach to poetry,
the human forms that poems present are temporal forms and, to borrow Aviram’s
terms again, various &dquo;tellings&dquo; of those forms into other media and modes. Given
that poetic worlds are largely worlds of words, this claims that the myriad forms of
both language itself and all of the other resources of the language arts (rhetoric,
discourse, etc.~what organizes their inventories of elements, levels of structure,
arrays of functions, and the like-are temporal, too. How this can be so is a long
story, one that exceeds by far the small space I am allocated here, but with the space
I have, I can sketch the basic contours of this claim.3 3
The first step in this temporal approach to the language arts is to clarify the nature
of human time. In the normal case, we think of human time as clock time, but this
is a mistake. Clock times are not human times; they are externally imposed. In
essence, they are ways of coordinating space, a fourth dimension of space added as
a further control to the standard three. Human times are rhythmically constructed;
they have little or nothing to do with clock time. As rhythms go, so goes time.
There are four types of human time, four types of human rhythm. While we do
not know these things for sure, my guess is that each of these times/rhythms is
associated with a major part of the brain, which is also quadratic in its form. We
have four brains: a reptilian/hind brain, a mammalian/mid-brain, a left cortex, and
a right. Each of these human rhythms has a relatively distinct form and therefore a
relatively distinct collection of representational powers. Because these rhythms
reflect the evolutionary history of the brain, features of these representational
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powers are also dialectically arrayed: each additional rhythm developed to over-
come the representational limitations of its predecessor. As most theories of the
human point up, human sensibility is essentially dialectical in form.
These four different rhythms can be recognized in our experience of any
temporal medium, but they are perhaps most evident in music, the most purely
temporal art. Musicians call these four rhythms meter, grouping, prolongation, and
theme.4 4
Meter is a beating: 1-2-3-4. It is essentially a response to tactile weight; it is very
subjective (or representationally poor); it is primarily physical/gestural in source;
and, while being performed, it strongly invites participation (we move with the
rhythmic stimulus). Structurally, it is declining in its contours of prominence; it is
relatively local in its scope of operation; it tends toward rigidly repetitive, binary
patterns; and it is essentially an ordering of identical events: beats of the same
strength are the same in other respects, too. As a result of these features, meter
constructs (what we might call) &dquo;cyclical&dquo; time.
Grouping is more flexible, divisive, and inclusive. It phrases a stimulus into parts
(and those parts into parts), each of which has some peak of prominence. The
essential motion of grouping is inward: it repetitively groups structurally weak
events around structurally strong events, ordering the result into a coherent hierar-
chy. In constructing this hierarchy, grouping is still fairly subjective, but it is more
responsive to a rhythmic stimulus than meter: it searches out differences among
sames. It is more proportional than repetitive, more concerned with global structural
dependencies than with local tactile weights, and more sensitive to climaxes than
to onsets (and therefore more concerned with middles than with beginnings). While
meter winds down and therefore falls in prominence, grouping prefers to rise,
crescendo. In music, grouping is closely associated with harmony. In its spatial
analogues, grouping resembles architecture. As a result of these features, grouping
constructs (what we might call) &dquo;centroidal&dquo; time.
Prolongation is more prospective and asymmetrical. It represents progress to and
from structural goals and therefore generates complex feelings of anticipation,
arrival, departure, and structural connection/continuity. If grouping keeps track of
differences among sames, prolongation tracks sames among differences. It evalu-
ates passing events for their causal connections, viewing events according to some
imposed perspective and, in so doing, evaluating the functional cooperation of
events within that perspective. If meter is concerned with the onsets of events and
grouping with their middles, prolongation is concerned with their ends-with
closure, termination, structural satisfaction/complementation. In music, prolonga-
tion is strongly related to melody. As a result of these features, prolongation
constructs (what we might call) &dquo;linear&dquo; time.
Theme is more volatile and discontinuous. It tracks contextual differences




strongly directed, theme is adirectional or multidirectional; it establishes simulta-
neous connections among events throughout a medium, weighing each event
according to its differential relation to many others. The basic structural figure in
theme is novelty/play. Structurally, it is unconstrained/free. When elaborated in full,
thematic connections are strongly representative and therefore approximate an
objective representation. If the temporal experience is complex, its thematic texture
will be unique. Given these features, theme constructs (what we might call)
&dquo;relative&dquo; time.
These features of our four human times-cyclical, centroidal, linear, and
relative-can be organized into a featural matrix that represents their dialectical
relations on a range of general parameters. I like to call this featural matrix &dquo;the
temporal paradigm.&dquo;
The basic claim I would like to make is that this temporal paradigm can provide
an informing substructure of a principled poetics (and, therefore, a principled
linguistics). The featural composition of each of these times, I would claim, forms
a distinct structural &dquo;complexion&dquo; that can be discerned throughout the disparate
materials that constitute the language arts and their contexts of use. In fact, these
structural complexions seem to have an even broader scope. They seem to represent
four natural temporal logics that occur throughout the biological world-both
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human and non. As the common products of evolutionary selection, all biological
forms share certain common structural traits. The four featural complexions in the
temporal paradigm represent what might be some of the most general of these
resemblances. From this perspective, these featural complexions might be viewed
as a type of evolutionary sediment, highly valued organizational forms that, from
the pressures of chance and effectiveness, have been selected again and again by
evolutionary history, with human neural anatomy, and therefore human sensibility
and human language, being instances of this selection.
The most basic fact about the temporal paradigm is its quadratic organization.
This quadratic organization claims that, in all human experience, domains of
activity tend to fracture into fours according to our four temporal capabilities. As
an activity gets more complex and in itself evolves a system of forms, this quadratic
organization will be reproduced again and again, in fractal arrays. Fours will break
into fours, which will break into fours, and so forth, to some limit of evolutionary
delicacy. While I certainly do not have time to explicate all of these correlations
here, these myriad embodiments of the four temporalities can also be represented
in paradigmatic form. I like to call this &dquo;the poetic paradigm.&dquo;’
With respect to human sensibility, the claims of this poetic paradigm converge
with the traditional view that the major human faculties are sense, feeling, will, and
thought/memory. Culturally, these claims converge with a quadratic analysis of the
cultural history of the West: Ancient, Medieval/Renaissance, Romantic/Nineteenth
century, and Modern/Postmodern. Linguistically, these claims converge with a
quadratic theory of levels of linguistic organization: paralanguage, prosody, syntax,
and semantics. Rhetorically, these claims converge with a quadratic theory of the
&dquo;master&dquo; tropes: metaphor, synecdoche, metonymy, and irony. Critically, these
claims converge with Northrop Frye’s quadratic theory of the literary genres and
modes of emplotment: epic, lyric, narrative, and dramatic; romance, comedy,
tragedy, and satire. Philosophically, these claims converge with Stephen Pepper’s
quadratic analysis of metaphysical systems: formism, organicism, mechanism, and
contextualism. Semantically, these claims re-invoke the Aristotelian categories of
quantity, quality, relation, and manner. And so forth.~ 
6
Much work will be needed to work out exactly what motivates these quadratic
arrays in each case and exactly how these arrays relate to one another within
language as a whole, but even at this early, speculative stage, the power of the
temporal and poetic paradigms to explain many of the inventories of forms claimed
by grammars such as GCElCGE is evident. For instance, in the light of this quadratic
theory, the existence of many of the quadratic arrays claimed by GCElCGE fall out
as a matter of course-the four major levels of grammatical organization (word,
phrase, clause, sentence), the four major word classes (noun, adjective, verb, and
adverb), the four basic sentence patterns (declarative, exclamative, imperative,
interrogative), the four basic moods (indicative, subjunctive, imperative, infinitive),
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the four basic elements of the clause (subject, verb, complement, adverbial), the
four major subcategories of adverbials (adjunct, subjunct, conjunct, and disjunct),
the four basic functions marked in the verb phrase (voice, aspect, modality, and
tense), the four basic functions marked in the noun phrase (number, gender, case,
and person), the four basic tenses (past, non-past, future, relative), the four basic
voices (passive, middle, active, causative), the four basic aspects (perfective,
imperfective, progressive, perfect), the four basic sorts of reference (generic,
indefinite, definite, proper). And so forth.
While I do not have space here to explicate these motivations in full, the features
of the four temporalities presented in the temporal paradigm also go a long way
toward motivating the relative positioning of elements in these quadratures with
respect to the four temporalities. For instance, the features of the centroidal
temporality connect conjunction, paradox, prosody, phrases, adjectives, modifica-
tion, subordination, hyponymy, aspect, and gender on the basis of their concern for
prominent differences among sames (and therefore essential parts/subsets within
containing wholes). They link these forms to rhetorical schemes such as chiasmus
and assonance in terms of their concern for structural middles versus structural
peripheries. They link these forms to the imperfective, the present tense, subjuncts,
clitic phrases, and the first person by their concern for local relations. They link
these forms to exclamatives and rise-fall intonation by their wavelike motion and
concern with emotion/affection. They link these forms to things like iconicity,
parallelism, simile, allegory, the pentameter, and the stanza by their concern for
correspondence and proportion. And so forth. As in preference rules systems (or,
more recently, optimality theory), the relations between particular structures and
one of the four temporalities are often determined by a convergence of several
features in the temporal paradigm.
A particularly striking feature of the fractal organization of this theory is its
ability to account for larger catalogs of forms, catalogues that are not multiples of
four, but something else. For instance, CGE (721 ) claims that there are exactly seven
basic clause patterns in English: SV, SVO, SVC, SVA, SVOO, SVOC, and SVOA.
CGE presents these patterns in no particular order and does not relate them in any
principled way to other structures in the grammar. Organizing these seven patterns
into a quadratic fractal, however, yields the following elegant organization:
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This fractal representation also helps to motivate the asymmetrical elaboration
within this paradigm. Within language as a whole, syntax is a reflex of linear time.
Among levels of syntactic structure, the clause is also a reflex of linear time. And
among basic clause patterns, transitives are a reflex of linear time, too. Therefore,
we might expect clausal structures to offer more transitive options than, say,
intransitives or copulars. In fact, given that syntax is linear, this theory would predict
that linear processes would appear more elaborated throughout the grammar-and
this does indeed seem to be the case. In general there are more types of clauses than
phrases, more cases than genders, more modalities than aspects, and so on.
This quadratic theory of human temporality is especially useful in motivating
the relationships among the myriad prosodic, linguistic, rhetorical, and cultural
forms that occur simultaneously in both individual poems and in our major poetic
styles (and, in turn, such stylistic convergences stand as evidence for the grammati-
cal claims of the temporal and poetic paradigms). The major difficulty with our
poetic theories has been their inability to connect such converging and co-occurring
stylistic features with the major purposes of poetry as an art. The theory of
temporality I am suggesting here claims that the central intent of poetry is always
a temporal dialectic. Depending on its historical positioning, a poem will front one
or another of these temporalities and then consider the difficulties this unnatural
temporal dominance entails for a full human existence, &dquo;telling&dquo; out this temporal
dilemma, first, into rhythmic forms themselves, and then into those linguistic,
rhetorical, and referential structures that &dquo;tell&dquo; the temporalities that these rhythmic
forms invoke and represent.
I do not have space to present a complex example here, but consider a simple
instance: the opening six lines of Whitman’s &dquo;Song of the Broad-Ax.,,7
Weapon shapely, naked, wan,
Head from the mother’s bowels drawn,
Wooded flesh and metal bone,
Limb only one and lip only one,
Gray-blue leaf by red-heat grown,
Helve produced from a little seed sown,
Resting the grass amid and upon,
To be lean’d and to lean on.
In the &dquo;Song of the Broad-Axe&dquo; as a whole, Whitman uses the central figure of the
broad-axe to celebrate &dquo;strong shapes and attributes of strong shapes,&dquo; a theme that
he extends in his characteristic way to include the strength of the body and physical
work and many other dimensions of American culture that relate to these: the strong
American personality, the strength of our democratic politics, the might of our
industrial production, the breadth and depth of our historical, geographical, and
ethnographical diversity, among others.
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To do this, he opens the poem with six lines that bend all of the resources of
language to a cyclical temporality, the temporality of the body. The basis for this
style, it seems evident, is Anglo-Saxon verse, the style that most closely approxi-
mates his purposes, but he modifies this traditional form so that it even more purely
invokes the physical/cyclical.
These six visual lines break into eight metrical lines that pound out their binary
meter to seven levels. By strongly controlling the number of syllables and stresses
between tactical beats, Whitman also strengthens the feeling that the meter is
dominating the language. The final line promotes its projectional beats (the two
instances of to) in an awkward fashion and strongly syncopates lean. This syllabism
energizes the meter in places where superfluous syllables and stresses collect or
expected syllables are lost (e.g., the consistently acephalous lines, the two instances
of only in line three, and in lines six and seven).
Like the Anglo-Saxon, Whitman supports this dominating meter with the sonic
equivalent of meter, alliteration, among tactical syllables within lines (weapon-wan,
limb-lip, gray-grown, seed-sown, etc.). But again, he strengthens this cyclical sound
by alliterating repeated words, unstressed syllables, stressed syllables off the beat,
and syllables across lines as well (e.g., wooded-one-one, gray-grown-grass, head-
heat-helve, mother’s-metal-amid, shapely-produced-upon, limb-lip-leaf-little-
lean’d-lean, produced-drawn, etc.). In an unusual gesture, both for him and for this
verse form, Whitman also rhymes his lines, but again in support of a cyclical
temporality, he blurs these rhymes so that they suggest just one, eightfold repetition:
wan, drawn, bone, one, grown, sown, upon, on.
Whitman also supports this meter with other prosodic and rhythmic structures.
For instance, most words of more than one syllable have falling stress contours
(weapon, shapely, naked, mother’s, wooded, metal, only, only, gray-blue, red-heat,
little, resting). Terminal tones on intonational contours are also predominantly
falling. (The passage is not itself a sentence, but the parts of the sentence that are
presented are declarative in structure and function.) Following meter as well,
grouping structures often fall (e.g., limb only one and lip only one) and prolongation
often extends (e.g., lines one and two, which both present nominal heads-weapon,
head-and then modify them-shapely, naked, wan; from the mother’s bowels
drawn).
Whitman also uses a cyclical syntax and morphology. He uses compounds
(gray-blue, red-heat), apposition of various sorts (shapely, naked, wan; weapon..., I
head ...,,tlesh ..., limb ..., etc.), nouns (weapon, head, flesh, bone, etc.), generic
reference (weapon, head, flesh, etc.), passives (drawn, grown, produced, to be
lean’d), intransitives (resting, lean), material and nominal modifiers (wooded,
metal), conjunction (limb... and lip, amid and upon, to be lean’d and to lean on),
ellipsis (throughout), color modifiers (wan, gray-blue, etc.), limiter subjuncts (only,
only), and numerals (one, one).
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He also supports the meter with a cyclical rhetoric: metaphor (the mother’s
bowels, wooded flesh, metal bone), fronting inversions (the grass amid and upon),
tight parallelism (throughout), and exact repetition (only one, only one, etc.).
Finally, almost all of the references in these lines are cultural correlates of the
cyclical. The poem makes explicit reference to origins (drawn, grown, sown), unity
(one, one), hunting and gathering (the broad-axe itself), kinship (mother’s), nature
(leaf, seed, grass), the body (naked, bowels, head, flesh, bone, limb, lip), the senses
(gray-blue, red-heat, wan), touch (red-heat, resting, lean on), and the military
(weapon).
This is a very simple instance of the explanatory power of the temporal approach
to poetry I am suggesting. But even here, the results are significant. In the light of
this theory, the convergence of just these stylistic features in just this context is no
accident. The temporal and poetic paradigms explain in a principled manner why
this occurs. Poetry &dquo;tells&dquo; time; the temporal and poetic paradigms give us detailed
access to the rhythmic sources of these &dquo;tellings.&dquo;
The temporal theory of language that I am suggesting is a major hypothesis about
the nature of language, and as with all such large hypotheses, it will take a long
time to work out its claims in full. However, if this suggestion can be worked into
a full account of language, it will constitute a striking intervention in linguistic
theory. 8
First, this temporal theory of language is interventionist in its shift in cognitive/
metaphysical mode from space to time. All of our theories of language have been
oriented toward space: Aristotelian logic, classical rhetoric, communication theory
(e.g., Jakobson’s anatomy of speech functions: phatic, conative, expressive, refer-
ential, etc.), Skinner’s behavioralism, Halliday’s social semiotics (textual, interper-
sonal, ideational, etc.), Langacker’s cognitive grammar (image-schemas, etc.),
speech act theory (Bakhtin, Austin, Searle), and so forth. Even our most dogmati-
cally formalistic theories (e.g., Bloomfieldian structuralism and Chomskian mini-
malism) have never suggested that language is essentially temporal.
Second, this temporal theory of language is interventionist in its suggestion that
the core structures in language are rigorously fractal. Many have claimed that
language is structural, rule-governed, hierarchical, recursive, modular, rank-
shifting, and many other things that are closely related to fractal form. But to my
knowledge, no one has ever suggested that-like clouds and mountain ranges-
language is also &dquo;generated&dquo; by preserving the results of an evolutionary iteration
that folds a simple structure self-reflexively within itself to minute levels of
delicacy. The most striking result of fractal form is a tight family resemblance
among disparate units, structures, events, and processes within the containing
whole. It is just these family resemblances, I maintain, that poets &dquo;know&dquo; and poems
&dquo;tell.&dquo;
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Third, this temporal theory of language is interventionist in providing a rich
linguistic formalism. The major difficulty with our formal theories of language has
been their poverty. More than anything else, it is this poverty that makes theorists
reject formalistic approaches to language for some more inclusive functionalism.
The temporal theory of language that I am suggesting is both formal and maximal.
Fourth, this temporal theory of language is interventionist in its emphasis on
similarities. As linguists have developed more rigorous theories of language, they
have tended to compartmentalize linguistic phenomena, underlining their differ-
ences. As a result of this emphasis on difference, our more inclusive theories of
language tend to be unmanageably diffuse. It has been this unnatural valorization
of difference that has rendered our linguistic theories of so little use in literary study
(stylistics, poetics, etc.). While our linguistic theories can describe the language of
poems in great detail, those descriptions, with their obtuse valorization of linguistic
difference, are (what I like to call) &dquo;analytical heaps,&dquo; and such &dquo;heaps&dquo; have little
resemblance to art. By stressing similarities rather than differences, the temporal
theory of language that I am suggesting overcomes these difficulties. It makes
possible a tightly integrated linguistics. The temporal and poetic paradigms provide
the bases for this integration.
Fifth, the temporal theory of language that I am suggesting is interventionist in
that it provides an independently motivated and therefore truly empirical formalism.
To this point, formalist theories of language have had to rely heavily on various
nonempirical evaluative assumptions (economy, simplicity, etc.), and even so, the
application of these nonempirical assumptions has been wildly uneven. The tem-
poral theory of language that I am suggesting can dispense with these nonempirical
assumptions. In this temporal theory, a linguistic description is well motivated to
the extent that it can be derived from the temporal paradigm; the temporal paradigm
catalogs and interrelates the most prominent qualities of rhythmic form; and these
qualities of rhythmic form can be experienced directly in many ways-for example,
in the rhythms of music, dance, poetry, and so forth.
Sixth, the temporal theory of language that I am suggesting is interventionist in
its claim that the core structures in language are the product of an evolutionary
process. The very possibility of organizing the prominent features of human
rhythms into the temporal paradigm results from viewing each subsequent rhythmic
&dquo;component&dquo; as a &dquo;solution&dquo; to the inherent limitations in its rhythmic predecessor-
meter leads to grouping, which leads to prolongation, which leads to theme. This
fourfold evolution then bends back on itself into an infinite loop (i.e., the relative
leads back to the cyclical, and the evolution repeats). This Viconian &dquo;recurso&dquo; is the
basis of the coherence of the temporal paradigm, which moves from similarity to
difference (and then back to similarity), repetition to distinction (and then back to
repetition), succession to simultaneity (and then back to succession), subjective to
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objective (and then back to subjective), fall to rise (and then back to fall), fixed to
free (and then back to fixed), reaction to creation (and then back to reaction),
passivity to improvisation (and then back to passivity), proximate to global (and
then back to proximate), and so forth. This temporal theory of language claims that
the underlying &dquo;logic&dquo; of language is biological; it is not mathematical, sociologi-
cal, semiotic, or whatever.
Seventh, this temporal theory of language is interventionist in that it creates a
deeply humanistic linguistics. The explanatory bases of language, this theory
maintains, are also the explanatory bases of the other major products of mind-our
senses, our psychological faculties, our social institutions and their historical
development, and so forth. Most dramatically, this theory claims that the explana-
tory bases of language are also at the basis of the arts (music, dance, poetry, etc.)
and, in fact, are best observed there. One of the saddest chapters in the history of
linguistics in this century has been the widening gap between the methods and
intentions of linguistic versus literary studies, and between both of these and study
of mind and culture more generally. The temporal theory of language I am
suggesting re-humanizes the linguistic.
Eighth, this temporal theory of language is interventionist in its inclusiveness,
and therefore in its expansive and unifying effect on the study of language proper.
Despite the admirable attempts by recent functional theories of language to become
more inclusive (e.g., treating semantics and pragmatics as well as grammar and
phonology, prosody and paralanguage as well as syntax), to preserve the coherence
of their functional approaches, all such theories exclude certain central linguistic
phenomena from their consideration. The most glaring instance of this, certainly,
is the exclusion of rhetorical tropes and schemes from most contemporary theories
of language, a gesture that divorces the modern study of language from the major
focus of the study of language in ancient times. The temporal theory of language I
am suggesting reunites the language arts.
Finally, the temporal theory of language that I am suggesting does not just reunite
and humanize linguistics and therefore make it sufficiently inclusive to consider
the language arts, it repositions the language arts back to the center of linguistic
theory. It reinvokes the ancient wisdom that our poets are our first and best linguists,
and therefore if we are to arrive at a deep understanding of language, the language
of poetry should be our first and best concern. The pretentious (and often empty)
scientism of much of modern linguistics has had the result of alienating from our
most intense and serious explorations of language just those who are most inti-
mately familiar with this central concern. Within our major universities, almost no
linguistics departments include scholars whose basic concern is to explore the
language arts, and in linguistic curricula, courses that examine the relation between
language and art are almost nonexistent. From the point of view of most linguistic
theories, poetic uses of language have been considered little more than precious
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and peripheral affairs, as though the art were a minor concern in human life and
therefore of minor import in the organization of human cognition, sensibility, and
therefore language.
The temporal theory of language that I am suggesting stands this attitude on its
head. If language is indeed a fractal elaboration of our human sensibilities, as this
theory claims, a major result is that language becomes essentially beautiful;
therefore, the &dquo;logic of linguistic theory,&dquo; if it is to follow what language is rather
than some set of external methodological constraints, must follow the contours of
the beautiful as well. The most productive way to arrive at a deeper understanding
of language, this theory implies, is to explore the role of beauty in human evolution,
sensibility, psychology, cultural formation, and cultural history
Notes
1. The revised and expanded version of GCE, The Comprehensive Grammar of
English (CGE), appeared in 1985. These grammars are different in many ways, but
the general issues that I am considering apply to both.
2. Jakobson’s best work in poetics has now been conveniently collected in
Jakobson (1987).
3. For a more detailed presentation and exemplification of the argument pre-
sented here, see Cureton (in press).
4. For a longer discussion of the first three of these rhythmic components in both
poetry and music, see Cureton (1992). For shorter summaries of these matters, see
Cureton (1993, 1994a, 1994b). For the best one-volume discussions of musical
rhythm, see Lerdahl and Jackendoff (1983) on classical tonal music and Kramer
(1988) on more contemporary forms.
5. For a lack of space, I do not print the poetic paradigm here. I think that my
argument and its applications to language are understandable without it. My major
claims here refer directly to the temporal paradigm. For a printing of the poetic
paradigm, see Cureton (in press).
6. See Frye (1957, 1963, 1981, 1990) and Pepper (1942). The intellectual sources
of the poetic paradigm are large and cannot be cited in full here. For a succinct
discussion of such quadratic organization in culture and history, see Thompson
(1971). For an extensive development of Frye, see White (1973, 1978, 1987). For
some of the biological and psychological bases of this quadratic organization, see
Anderson (1995), Donald (1991), and MacLean (1973). See Ong (1982) for the
features of oral societies, Lovejoy (1936) and Tillyard (1942) for features of
Medieval and Renaissance culture, Foucault (1973) and McLuhan (1962) on
features of nineteenth-century culture, and Jameson (1991) for features of postmod-




8. The linguistic theory that resembles a temporal approach to language most
closely is Kenneth Pike’s tagmemics, especially his analysis of grammatical phe-
nomena into four-cell tagmems: unit, slot, role, and relation. For some work on
tagmemics, see Pike (1959, 1967, 1982) and Pike and Pike (1982, 1983).
9. This centering of time, beauty, and the arts in biological evolution and cultural
activity resembles Frederick Turner’s "natural classicism" and its sources in the
work of J. T. Fraser and the Society for the Study of Time. See Turner (1991,1992)
and Fraser (1966, 1975), and Fraser et al. (1972-89).
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